Devil Red

http://www.npf.org.tw/particle-1079-2.html
詹中原
　　意識形態(ideology)往往是各國在制訂政策上主要的依循方向。沒有意識形態主導的政策，可以說是沒有方向的政策。政策若失去了方向的引導，除了喪失政策本身的定位之外，也可能造成制訂政策的失敗。所以為什麼有一些國家同樣是制訂社會福利政策，所出來的政策結果卻是不同的，到底是什麼方式影響了各國在制訂政策時，是意識形態呢？還是選舉策略？
　　以美國的兩黨制為例，共和黨傳統上是以中產階級的支持為主，而民主黨的傳統中堅分子乃是工會、自由派和黑人的支持，共和黨與民主黨在執政之後，對於在選舉之前的意識形態是否會因其執政之後而有所變遷？變遷幅度有多大？兩黨之間的意識形態是否會因為選舉時的競爭而趨同(convergence)？雖然兩黨都是以主流政黨為號召，並在若干的政策上有基本的共識，但是在許多公共政策的面向上，兩黨還是有所區隔。這些區隔究竟是兩黨基本上意識形態的不同所影響，還是因為選舉時，面對主流的民意，所不得不提出的花招。況且美國兩黨都會產生這樣的狀況，更何況是與美國相近的英國以及不同系絡(context)的法國、德國與泛北歐系的國家。所以政黨的意識形態，總是會隨著主流民意與大環境的變化，相對應地在政策綱領上進行調整，而民意的趨向，則是反映在各國大選的結果上。
　　而當前世界各國的國家形態約可分類為：一是以美國、英國為主的央格魯薩克遜為主的國家治理的意識形態；二是以歐洲國家(含泛北歐國家)為主的國家治理意識形態。在以美國、英國為主的央格魯薩克遜為主的國家型態，強調政府再造式的改革，是奠基在新公共管理以及新右派的市場上。而以歐洲國家(含泛北歐國家)為主的國家型態上強調國家對於社會福利的重視，反對以英美為馬首是瞻的新公共管理改革模式，強調國家應負起照顧人民的權益，涉及到公共利益的民營化更是要由國家來管理與執行，不可交由民間來執行。汎北歐國家的模式，就是要建立「平等」制度，其特色包括：公共性質濃厚的社會政策、高度的普遍主義、國家強力介入及高稅率與高給付水準；就其細目而言，汎北歐國家（包含瑞典、挪威、丹麥、芬蘭）對於政策的細目還是有其不同之處。

The Four Networks in the United States
How does the Four Networks theory apply to the United States? This section shows why it is plausible to suggest that there is class domination in the United States, especially compared to most other democratic capitalist countries. Economic elites have had no serious power rivals in the United States for a number of complex historical reasons.
When the United States is viewed in historical-comparative perspective as a fragment of the European system of capitalist nation-states, there is a prima facie case that leaders from the capitalist class are more powerful than in European nations and in comparison to any other group or the federal government. First, America did not have a feudal past, so its capitalists were not hindered by a rival economic class that had to be battled, assimilated, or deferred to in attempting to dominate the state. Conversely, the absence of such a rival economic elite meant that the state could not play off one strong economic class against another in an attempt to gain autonomy from the capitalist elites.
In Europe, the feudal landlords and state elites were able to limit the rise of corporate capitalism, and even to insist that capitalists had to bargain with organized workers. In the United States, there were no restraints on the rise of giant corporations from these sources, and the corporations were able to eliminate most attempts at union organization. That is a huge difference in terms of the wealth and income distribution, and in terms of the use of government to provide collective social benefits like health care insurance and a good retirement income.
By the late 19th century, the nationwide nature of the transportation and communication systems, and the commonality of language, education, and culture, meant that the bases for class solidarity were present for both corporate owners and their employees, although the corporate community was far more cohesiveness than the working class for a variety of reasons. Still, class conflict over wages, hours, working conditions, and other issues has frequently manifested itself since the late 19th century. Contrary to pluralists and state autonomy theorists, and in agreement with Marxists on this issue, I believe class conflict was the single most important factor (but not the only factor) driving American politics in the 20th century, even overshadowing the more visible and violent struggles over racial inclusion and exclusion.

The Origins of Modern-Day Power Structures in Europe
To understand the American power structure, we first have to consider briefly the power structures in the European civilizations that created colonies in what is now the United States.
The modern era of state and class relations in Europe had its origins in the first few centuries after the disintegration of the Roman Empire between 337 and 476 A.D. The institution of private property developed in the context of a system of numerous small, weak states that struggled along in the territory previously dominated by the militarized Roman state. This economic development was made possible by the "normative pacification" provided by the Catholic Church, which increased greatly in its power, and by the predominance of military techniques that rendered armored knights on horseback ascendant over serfs and peasants (Mann, 1986, pp. 376-378, 390-391).
In this context, it is important to note, feudal lords did not need "states" to protect their private property and increase the exploitation of producing classes. They dominated the peasantry through their own military capabilities in a context where religion played a role in sustaining and justifying hierarchy. Moreover, the weakness of the many small states was one factor that allowed the system of private property to take deeper root without the danger of state appropriation, and for an independent merchant class to develop. The result was a growing independence for the economic network in general: "By the time trade was really buoyant (1150 to 1250 A.D.)," claims Mann (1986, p. 397), "it was accompanied by merchant and artisan institutions with an autonomy unparalleled in other civilizations."
Put more strongly, weak states and a common religious ideology made it possible for economic networks in Europe to obtain a degree of independence that is not found elsewhere. The history of China, for example, is a history of states fighting back and forth to gain the upper hand. First, there were many small states, then one big state that eventually overextended itself, followed by hundreds of years of many smaller states, and then the cycle repeated itself into the 20th century, when the Chinese Communist Party created an extremely strong state after its 1949 triumph. The ideology network is always at the service of the state -- no independent religious organizations developed in China. And the means of organized violence are controlled by states, except when militarized outsiders march in and conquer the Chinese state or states. Then these warlords monopolize violence for themselves as the new state rulers, and become assimilated into Chinese society.

The Four Networks Theory of Power: A Theoretical Home for Power Structure Research
by G. William Domhoff
April 2005
This document explains why and how organizations are the starting point for understanding power. It focuses on four main organizational networks -- ideological, economic, military, and political -- as the building blocks for power structures. To provide a backdrop for understanding the American power structure, it then briefly applies the theory to Europe from the Middle Ages to the 19th century, showing how the economic and political networks gradually subordinated the ideological and military networks. Finally, it shows how the theory explains the class domination that characterizes the American power structure.
The theoretical starting point for power structure research is a seemingly mundane one, but that's what makes it very useful: power is rooted in organizations. From that humble beginning we can soon reach classes, states, the military and the ideological organizations that provide the basis for the collective search for meaning and forgiveness (organized religions).

The Higher Immorality
excerpts from the book: The Power Elite
by C.Wright Mills
Oxford Press, 1956
The higher immorality can neither be narrowed to the political sphere nor understood as primarily a matter of corrupt men in fundamentally sound institutions. Political corruption is one aspect of a more general immorality; the level of moral sensibility that now prevails is not merely a matter of corrupt men. The higher immorality is a systematic feature of the American elite; its general acceptance is an essential feature of the mass society.

The Mass Society
from the book: The Power Elite
by C.Wright Mills
Oxford Press, 1956
In the standard image of power and decision, no force is held to be as important as The Great American Public. More than merely another check and balance, this public is thought to be the seat of all legitimate power. In official life as in popular folklore, it is held to be the very balance wheel of democratic power. In the end, all liberal theorists rest their notions of the power system upon the political role of this public; all official decisions, as well as private decisions of consequence, are justified as in the public's welfare; all formal proclamations are in its name.

The Military Ascendancy
from the book: The Power Elite
by C. Wright Mills
Oxford Press, 1956

The Warlords
from the book: The Power Elite
by C.Wright Mills
Oxford Press, 1956
During the eighteenth century, observers of the historic scene began to notice a remarkable trend in the division of power at the top of modern society: Civilians, coming into authority, were able to control men of military violence, whose power, being hedged in and neutralized, declined. At various times and places, of course, military men had been the servants of civilian decision, but this trend-which reached its climax in the nineteenth century and lasted until World War I-seemed then, and still seems, remarkable simply because it had never before happened on such a scale or never before seemed so firmly grounded.

The Chief Executives
from the book: The Power Elite
by C.Wright Mills
Oxford Press, 1956
The corporations are the organized centers of the private property system: the chief executives are the organizers of that system. As economic men, they are at once creatures and creators of the corporate revolution, which, in brief, has transformed property from a tool of the workman into an elaborate instrument by which his work is controlled and a profit extracted from it. The small entrepreneur is no longer the key to the economic life of America; and in many economic sectors where small producers and distributors do still exist they strive mightily-as indeed they must if they are not to be extinguished-to have trade associations or governments act for them as corporations act for big industry and finance.

The Higher Circles
from the book: The Power Elite
by C. Wright Mills
Oxford Press, 1956
The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family, and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern. 'Great changes' are beyond their control, but affect their conduct and outlook none the less. The very framework of modern society confines them to projects not their own, but from every side, such changes now press upon the men and women of the mass society, who accordingly feel that they are without purpose in an epoch in which they are without power.