Devil Red

http://www.npf.org.tw/particle-1079-2.html
詹中原
　　意識形態(ideology)往往是各國在制訂政策上主要的依循方向。沒有意識形態主導的政策，可以說是沒有方向的政策。政策若失去了方向的引導，除了喪失政策本身的定位之外，也可能造成制訂政策的失敗。所以為什麼有一些國家同樣是制訂社會福利政策，所出來的政策結果卻是不同的，到底是什麼方式影響了各國在制訂政策時，是意識形態呢？還是選舉策略？
　　以美國的兩黨制為例，共和黨傳統上是以中產階級的支持為主，而民主黨的傳統中堅分子乃是工會、自由派和黑人的支持，共和黨與民主黨在執政之後，對於在選舉之前的意識形態是否會因其執政之後而有所變遷？變遷幅度有多大？兩黨之間的意識形態是否會因為選舉時的競爭而趨同(convergence)？雖然兩黨都是以主流政黨為號召，並在若干的政策上有基本的共識，但是在許多公共政策的面向上，兩黨還是有所區隔。這些區隔究竟是兩黨基本上意識形態的不同所影響，還是因為選舉時，面對主流的民意，所不得不提出的花招。況且美國兩黨都會產生這樣的狀況，更何況是與美國相近的英國以及不同系絡(context)的法國、德國與泛北歐系的國家。所以政黨的意識形態，總是會隨著主流民意與大環境的變化，相對應地在政策綱領上進行調整，而民意的趨向，則是反映在各國大選的結果上。
　　而當前世界各國的國家形態約可分類為：一是以美國、英國為主的央格魯薩克遜為主的國家治理的意識形態；二是以歐洲國家(含泛北歐國家)為主的國家治理意識形態。在以美國、英國為主的央格魯薩克遜為主的國家型態，強調政府再造式的改革，是奠基在新公共管理以及新右派的市場上。而以歐洲國家(含泛北歐國家)為主的國家型態上強調國家對於社會福利的重視，反對以英美為馬首是瞻的新公共管理改革模式，強調國家應負起照顧人民的權益，涉及到公共利益的民營化更是要由國家來管理與執行，不可交由民間來執行。汎北歐國家的模式，就是要建立「平等」制度，其特色包括：公共性質濃厚的社會政策、高度的普遍主義、國家強力介入及高稅率與高給付水準；就其細目而言，汎北歐國家（包含瑞典、挪威、丹麥、芬蘭）對於政策的細目還是有其不同之處。

The Four Networks in the United States
How does the Four Networks theory apply to the United States? This section shows why it is plausible to suggest that there is class domination in the United States, especially compared to most other democratic capitalist countries. Economic elites have had no serious power rivals in the United States for a number of complex historical reasons.
When the United States is viewed in historical-comparative perspective as a fragment of the European system of capitalist nation-states, there is a prima facie case that leaders from the capitalist class are more powerful than in European nations and in comparison to any other group or the federal government. First, America did not have a feudal past, so its capitalists were not hindered by a rival economic class that had to be battled, assimilated, or deferred to in attempting to dominate the state. Conversely, the absence of such a rival economic elite meant that the state could not play off one strong economic class against another in an attempt to gain autonomy from the capitalist elites.
In Europe, the feudal landlords and state elites were able to limit the rise of corporate capitalism, and even to insist that capitalists had to bargain with organized workers. In the United States, there were no restraints on the rise of giant corporations from these sources, and the corporations were able to eliminate most attempts at union organization. That is a huge difference in terms of the wealth and income distribution, and in terms of the use of government to provide collective social benefits like health care insurance and a good retirement income.
By the late 19th century, the nationwide nature of the transportation and communication systems, and the commonality of language, education, and culture, meant that the bases for class solidarity were present for both corporate owners and their employees, although the corporate community was far more cohesiveness than the working class for a variety of reasons. Still, class conflict over wages, hours, working conditions, and other issues has frequently manifested itself since the late 19th century. Contrary to pluralists and state autonomy theorists, and in agreement with Marxists on this issue, I believe class conflict was the single most important factor (but not the only factor) driving American politics in the 20th century, even overshadowing the more visible and violent struggles over racial inclusion and exclusion.

The Origins of Modern-Day Power Structures in Europe
To understand the American power structure, we first have to consider briefly the power structures in the European civilizations that created colonies in what is now the United States.
The modern era of state and class relations in Europe had its origins in the first few centuries after the disintegration of the Roman Empire between 337 and 476 A.D. The institution of private property developed in the context of a system of numerous small, weak states that struggled along in the territory previously dominated by the militarized Roman state. This economic development was made possible by the "normative pacification" provided by the Catholic Church, which increased greatly in its power, and by the predominance of military techniques that rendered armored knights on horseback ascendant over serfs and peasants (Mann, 1986, pp. 376-378, 390-391).
In this context, it is important to note, feudal lords did not need "states" to protect their private property and increase the exploitation of producing classes. They dominated the peasantry through their own military capabilities in a context where religion played a role in sustaining and justifying hierarchy. Moreover, the weakness of the many small states was one factor that allowed the system of private property to take deeper root without the danger of state appropriation, and for an independent merchant class to develop. The result was a growing independence for the economic network in general: "By the time trade was really buoyant (1150 to 1250 A.D.)," claims Mann (1986, p. 397), "it was accompanied by merchant and artisan institutions with an autonomy unparalleled in other civilizations."
Put more strongly, weak states and a common religious ideology made it possible for economic networks in Europe to obtain a degree of independence that is not found elsewhere. The history of China, for example, is a history of states fighting back and forth to gain the upper hand. First, there were many small states, then one big state that eventually overextended itself, followed by hundreds of years of many smaller states, and then the cycle repeated itself into the 20th century, when the Chinese Communist Party created an extremely strong state after its 1949 triumph. The ideology network is always at the service of the state -- no independent religious organizations developed in China. And the means of organized violence are controlled by states, except when militarized outsiders march in and conquer the Chinese state or states. Then these warlords monopolize violence for themselves as the new state rulers, and become assimilated into Chinese society.

The Four Networks Theory of Power: A Theoretical Home for Power Structure Research
by G. William Domhoff
April 2005
This document explains why and how organizations are the starting point for understanding power. It focuses on four main organizational networks -- ideological, economic, military, and political -- as the building blocks for power structures. To provide a backdrop for understanding the American power structure, it then briefly applies the theory to Europe from the Middle Ages to the 19th century, showing how the economic and political networks gradually subordinated the ideological and military networks. Finally, it shows how the theory explains the class domination that characterizes the American power structure.
The theoretical starting point for power structure research is a seemingly mundane one, but that's what makes it very useful: power is rooted in organizations. From that humble beginning we can soon reach classes, states, the military and the ideological organizations that provide the basis for the collective search for meaning and forgiveness (organized religions).

全球暖化的政治倫理——為氣候政治建立目的王國
應用倫理研究通訊
http://www.ncu.edu.tw/~phi/NRAE/newsletter/no32/03.htm
葉保強*
壹、前言

市場、國家與制度安排：福利國家社會管制方式變遷
http://tsp.ec.tku.edu.tw/QuickPlace/113922qp/Main.nsf/$defaultview/4198746D262A6988482572200060DB67/$File/Lee2000a.htm?OpenElement
李碧涵 國立台灣大學國家發展研究所副教授
中文摘要
本文旨在探討福利國家體制之制度變遷，以及其社會管制方式（mode of social regulation，MSR）的變化。本文首先檢視相關的理論，包括經濟的社會鑲嵌理論、福利國家體制理論、全球化與後福特國家理論，和管制理論。其次，本文分析福利國家歷史制度安排的不同而呈現其為社會民主、自由或保守體制；不過福利國家面臨外在的經濟全球化而必須有新的制度安排。雖然新自由主義的全球化策略使得福利國家改革逐漸趨向一致性的發展，即同樣採取自由化、市場化、國家解除管制政策等，但也因福利國家改革的制度安排方式不同，即依市場、國家或家庭取向的不同重要性所做的制度安排，而呈現不相同的轉型路徑。本文接著探討福利國家社會管制方式的制度變遷，其分別就家庭制度、勞動體制與教育制度、健康與環境保護制度探究其社會管制方式的變遷。本文最後的結論則認為當前福利國家轉型和其社會管制方式的制度變遷將會形塑廿一世紀市場與國家之新制度關係。

思想 第三期 「天下、東亞、台灣」聯經出版
對民主與市場的反思：一個政治學者在21世紀開端的沉痛思考
朱雲漢

http://www.japanresearch.org.tw/politics-38.asp
互動治理：數位時代之民主
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　台灣大學政治學研究所博士班研究生
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　王文岳

Delusions About Democracy
By ERIC HOBSBAWM
http://www.counterpunch.org/hobsbawm01252005.html
Although President Bush's uncompromising second inaugural address does not so much as mention the words Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terror, he and his supporters continue to engage in a planned reordering of the world. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are but one part of a supposedly universal effort to create world order by "spreading democracy". This idea is not merely quixotic--it is dangerous. The rhetoric implies that democracy is applicable in a standardised (western) form, that it can succeed everywhere, that it can remedy today's transnational dilemmas, and that it can bring peace, rather than sow disorder. It cannot.
Democracy is rightly popular. In 1647, the English Levellers broadcast the powerful idea that "all government is in the free consent of the people". They meant votes for all. Of course, universal suffrage does not guarantee any particular political result, and elections cannot even ensure their own perpetuation--witness the Weimar Republic. Electoral democracy is also unlikely to produce outcomes convenient to hegemonic or imperial powers. (If the Iraq war had depended on the freely expressed consent of "the world community", it would not have happened). But these uncertainties do not diminish its justified appeal.

After Winning the War
The Empire Expands Wider and Still Wider
By ERIC HOBSBAWM
http://www.counterpunch.org/hobsbawm06112003.html
The present world situation is quite unprecedented. The great global empires that have been seen before, such as the Spanish in the 16th and 17th centuries, and notably the British in the 19th and 20th centuries, bear little comparison with what we see today in the United States empire. The present state of globalisation is unprecedented in its integration, its technology and its politics.